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Alliance Size and Airline 
Performance 
Robert T. Hamilton 
Sussie C. Morrish 
This paper is a replication and extension of some previous work that seeks to 
isolate the effect of alliance size on the profitability of nine international 
airlines over the period from 1985 through to 2000. The paper begins with two 
contrasting industry viewpoints on the effect of alliances on airline 
performance. The findings suggest that, while the number of alliance partners 
has some effect in raising employee productivity, it has no direct effects on the 
passenger loadings or pricing behaviour Furthermore, we found no evidence 
that alliance size has any direct effect on the overall profitability of the airlines 
involved and, in particular, none to suggest that larger alliances lead to higher 
airfares. We conclude that it is higher employee productivity and the ability of 
a carrier to charge higher fares per passenger per kilometre that are the main 
influences on airline profitability. 
Introduction 
"Participation in such an alliance creates value for all KLM stakeholders." KLM 
Annual Report, 1999-2000, p. 12. 
"Adding new members can actually reduce the value existing members enjoy." 
Managing Director, Oneworld, The Times of London, 23 November 2002, p.83. 
While strategic alliances among the major airlines dominate this global 
industry, these opening extracts are intended to raise the question of the effect 
of alliance size on the profitability of individual airlines. There have been few 
empirical studies of the impact of alliance size on the performance of the member 
airlines. Airline alliances have grown in size because incumbent and new members 
anticipate that adding more partners will lead to improved performance for all 
concerned. This may happen through a combination of effects including improved 
competitiveness (Jarillo, 1993), market access (Oum, et al., 2000, p.200), and 
economies of both scale (Gomes, 1996) and of scope (Button, et al., 1998). It is 
for these reasons that alliance membership became attractive to many more of 
the international carriers since the mid 1980s following the formation of the first 
trans-Atlantic code sharing alliances. In 1989, eight European and North American 
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carriers had formed themselves into three different alliance groupings: European 
Quality Alliance (Air France, SAS, Swissair); Global Excellence Alliance (Delta. 
Singapore Airlines, Swissair) and the KLM /Northwest Airlines alliance. By 
2000,24 of the largest international carriers had formed into two dominant alliances. 
Star and One World, representing around 50% of all international capacity. 
Alongside these major groupings there are many smaller alliances such as 
Qualiflyer and Wings, and a number of quite successful 'budget' carriers such 
as Southwest (Morrison, 2001), Easyjet and Ryanair, which have not formed any 
alliances. 
Literature Review 
The few empirical studies that have been done have tended to focus on North 
Atlantic alliances (Button et al., 1998, p. 100). The early studies were governmental 
and regulatory investigations commissioned by the governments of the USA 
and the UK concerned about anti-trust implications (Gellman Research 
Associates, 1994; UK Civil Aviation Authority Investigation, 1994; US General 
Accounting Office, 1995). In terms of operating performance, most previous 
studies (Gellman Research Associates, 1994; US General Accounting Office, 
1995; Park, 1997; Oum et al., 2000, p. 120) find increased traffic volume on alliance-
served routes. The exception is Dresner, et al. (1995) who report mixed findings 
from their study of the effect of alliances on North Atlantic traffic volumes. 
Improved traffic volumes and passenger loadings should, other things being 
equal, give rise to improved performance for the carriers involved. In their study 
Oum et al. (2000, p.89) constructed an aggregate productivity index as the quotient 
of a carrier's overall output index and its overall input index. They found that 
membership of 'major' alliances (i.e., those in which the partner airlines actually 
link their networks) gained a 4.8% increase in overall productivity compared to 
only 1.7% in 'minor' alliances where there was cooperation at the route level but 
no combining of networks. 
The conventional economic view of pricing behaviour and profitability 
would suggest that alliances serve to increase collective market power and so 
allow higher prices to be charged to passengers. Some researchers have found 
evidence of this in particular alliances (Youssef & Hansen, 1994; Park, 1997). On 
the other hand, two more recent studies (Oum et al., 2000; Brueckner & Whalen, 
2000) have found quite significant fare lowering among airlines in alliances. This 
is attributed to increasing competition and the productivity gains from alliance 
membership. In Oum et al.'s (2000) study, fare levels dropped by about the same 
extent as productivity improved. The report by Gellman Research Associates 
(1994) investigated the effect of alliance membership on revenue, cost, and net 
profit in two of the early trans-Atlantic alliances, British Airways/US Air and 
KLM/Northwest. It found market share and profitability gains for all partners 
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with BA and Northwest gaining more than their partners in terms of net profit. 
Other trans-Atlantic carriers reported reduced profits. These findings were 
broadly confirmed in the study of the same two alliances and three others 
conducted by the US General Accounting Office (1995). The study by Oum et al. 
(2000) used a complex measure of profitability derived by dividing total revenues 
by total input costs. They found profitability to be raised by 1.5% for airlines in 
a 'major' alliance and by 0.3% for carriers involved in the 'minor' alliances. Since 
these authors found alliance size to be associated with increases in productivity 
and with decreases in fare levels, the question remained as to which of these was 
the main source of increases in airline profitability. They found that fare reductions 
had not generated enough additional demand and that productivity gains, due 
to alliance size and other factors, was the main source of increased profitability. 
We return to this issue later in the paper. 
The purpose of the work reported in the body of the paper is to isolate the 
effect of alliance size on the profitability performance of the individual airlines 
involved. In the next section of the paper we introduce the database we 
constructed from information provided largely by the airlines. The study's overall 
design is presented next and includes the definition of the variables used. We 
then estimate the regression models, report the results, and discuss our findings. 
The paper concludes with a summary and a discussion of the weaknesses we 
see in our approach. 
Database on Alliances and Airline Performance 
We began with the list of the top 50 scheduled airlines ranked in terms of 
profitability published in the World Airline Directory by Flight International in 
1998. Three criteria were used to produce a cross-section broadly representative 
of the world industry. First we sought to include members of the established 
alliance groupings viz., Star Alliance, One World Alliance, and KLM/ 
Northwestern. Second, we selected carriers of different size and with varying 
lengths of time in alliances. Third, we selected carriers from each of the three 
strategic regions - North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. We ended up with 
the sample of nine major airlines listed in Table 1. In 1999, these nine airlines 
employed 426,500 people; carried around 350 million passengers; and flew a 
total of 1,191,134 million available seat kilometres, up 32% from the 1992 level. 
A new panel database was created to investigate the effect of alliance 
formation on the operating and financial performance of airlines. The approach 
replicates aspects of the study by Oum et al. (2000) but with three differences. 
Firstly, the ability to measure operating and financial performance directly using 
standard aviation and accounting-based measures used by most airlines. 
Secondly, the data cover a longer period, from 1985 through to 2000. This period 
was chosen because it contained some early years when there was little or no 
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Table 1. Characteristics of sample airlines (1999-2000) 
Region 
Carrier 
North America 
American 
United 
Northwest 
Air Canada 
Europe 
British Airways 
KLM 
Asia-Pacific 
Qantas 
Singapore 
Air NZ 
Alliance 
partners 2000 
(number) 
32 
30 
25 
23 
27 
32 
2l) 
20 
IS 
Average staff 
numbers 1999 
(thousand) 
111.6 
96.0 
51.8 
23.0 
64.6 
28.4 
28.2 
13.7 
9.2 
Available Seat 
Kms 1999 
(million) 
259,388 
284,288 
160,009 
54,658 
167,265 
74,155 
79,233 
83,192 
28,946 
Alliance 
grouping 
One World 
Star Alliance 
KLM/N'west 
Star Alliance 
One World 
KLM/N'west 
One World 
Star Alliance 
Star Alliance 
Sources: Flight International and airline Annual Reports for 2000 (as supplied by the airlines 
involved). 
alliance effect on the operating and financial performance of the carriers. Thirdly, 
while most of our carriers do operate on the North Atlantic, this is not the case 
for all of them and hence having a broader focus than most previous studies. 
Some variables were also measured such as differences in airline size but this 
however does not represent a major difference between the studies. 
A panel of data was built from the Annual Reports of the airlines and other 
public documents for the 16 year period from 1985 - 2000 inclusive, longer than 
that of previous studies but one that was deemed appropriate for this purpose. 
Although alliances as we know them today were already formed in the United 
States in the early 1980s, it was not until the late 1980s that the first international 
alliances began to emerge. So, to help isolate alliance effects, database was 
extended back in time to an era when there were no international alliances in 
place. In 1985, our sample airlines had zero international alliance partners 
compared with an average of 26 by 1999/2000. All airline operational data and 
accounting data were extracted from the reports supplied by the airlines. 
Research Design 
The general framework for this study is in Figure 1. The main concern is explaining 
the variations in airline profitability, as measured by their annual rates of return 
on assets and on sales, and in so doing, to isolate any impact due to alliance size. 
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Alliance size 
Aiiiine size 
Journey length 
Diversification 
Government 
ownership 
Year effects 
^ 
W 
(direct effect) 
Labour productivity 
Passenger load factor 
Pricing behaviour 
Year effects 
^ 
W 
^ 
Airline 
profitability: 
ROAssets 
ROSales 
Figure 1: Schematic of Alliance Size and Performance 
This study is interested in isolating the effect of alliance size on profitability 
in a complex industry with considerable interdependencies among the variables 
that are measured. The design set out in Figure 1 does reflect the approach of 
Oum et al. (2000) and is adopted in recognition of their major contribution to this 
area and our own intention to replicate aspects oi^ their study as closely as 
possible. In the first instance, again following Oum et al. (2000) there is an 
assumption that there are no fixed airline effects in the model that are not 
adequately captured by the variables included. A fixed effects model is reported 
later in the paper. 
In working across the model from left to right, it is expected that the five 
airline-specific variables (alliance size, airline size, journey length, diversification, 
and government ownership) and specific year effects, would be able to explain 
variations in what might be called 'operating performance' (labour productivity 
and passenger load factors) and the pricing behaviour of the airlines, i.e., 
differences in their ability to charge passengers per kilometre flown. Operating 
performance and pricing behaviours then feature as the immediate determinants 
of airline profitability, along with any direct effect of alliance size on profitability 
and the specific year effects for the profitability variables. 
Definitions of Variables 
Airline Profitability 
In embarking on this study difficulty was encountered in using accounting 
measures of profitability particularly when comparing performance across 
countries. This arises from national differences in the calculations of costs (e.g., 
depreciation and the treatment of R&D expenditures) and revenues. Nevertheless, 
noting the emphasis given to such accounting measures in the airlines' Annual 
Reports, it was decided to feature these in this study. 
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ROA: before interest and tax return as percentage of total assets employed 
ROS: net profit as a percentage of (net) sales 
ROE, the after tax return to shareholders was not used because of a lack of 
data and the further complication of controlling for the effect of leverage on 
ROE. The available data did however confirm significant correlations between 
ROE and both ROA (r = +0.59) and ROS (r = 0.35). 
Alliance Size 
This is a key explanatory variable measured by the number of alliance partners 
(PARTNERS) in each year from 1985 to 2000. Data on the number of alliance 
partners was gleaned from a variety of sources including Flight International's 
World Airline Directory, company reports and websites, and back issues oi 
aviation magazines. 
Operating Performance and Pricing Behaviour 
The data for passenger load factor (PLF) were taken directly from the Annual 
Reports of the airlines. This is a common measure of airline capacity utilisation, 
normally expressed as revenue passenger-kilometres as a percentage of available 
seat kilometres. In addition to the PLF measures, a somewhat crude measure of 
aggregate employee productivity computed simply as the ratio of total 
passengers carried / total staff employed was used (EMPROD). These two 
measures are obviously related and indicate the extent to which the aircraft 
capacity and labour force are being utilised by the volume of passengers earned. 
The PRICE variable was computed as passenger revenue per passenger 
per kilometre. The values are real US dollars using the method adopted by Oum 
et al. (2000, p.89). All currencies were converted into the equivalent nominal US 
Dollars using Purchasing Power Parity indices for each year. Nominal values 
were also deflated to real US Dollars using the USA GDP deflator series for the 
1985-2000 period1. 
Airline Control Variables 
In addition, four airline-specific variables to control for airline size; trip length; 
diversification; and government ownership was used. Oum et al. (2000) used 
employee numbers to measure airline size and hence the potential for scale 
economies in airline operations. However this measure was not used because, 
over time, it will be affected by differences in outsourcing policies across the 
carriers. This study opted instead for a measure of output capacity - available 
seat kilometres or ASKs-which is a generally accepted measure of size. Three 
proxies to control for the average passenger trip length flown by each airline 
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(AVTRIP) calculated as the quotient of revenue per passenger and revenue per 
passenger per kilometre; all non-passenger revenue as % of total revenue 
(OTHER); and a binary variable for the extent of government ownership2 in the 
study period (GOWN) was used. 
Year Effects 
Using a simple trend variable to capture year effects implies at least the expectation 
of steady changes in performance from year to year. Observations however 
suggested that this has not been the case in the international airline industry. 
Regressions were run for each measure of airline performance on the set of year 
dummy variables for the entire period 1985 through 2000, with 1985 being 
'excluded' to act as the benchmark year for each of the dependent variables. 
The main event in this period was the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath. The mean 
ROA value was markedly lower in 1991, 1992, and 1993 (by around 4 percentage 
points in each of these years), an effect attributed to this conflagration. The ROS 
also fell markedly by 5 percentage points but only in 1991. Employee productivity 
began to pick up after the Gulf War as passengers returned to international 
travel: EMPROD was significantly higher in each year from 1994 through 2000 
and, by 1997, capacity utilisation also began to improve with the PLFs significantly 
above their benchmark level in the period 1997 through 2000. The main falls in 
real passenger fares also came at the end of the period, from 1996 to 2000. This 
study ascribes this effects to factors not otherwise included in the model and 
represent them with the appropriate YEAR dummy variable specifications for 
each of the affected dependent variables. 
Analysis and Findings 
The database pools the available annual data for each airline for the period 1985-
2000 to provide the researchers with estimates that reflect the collective experience 
of these carriers over the period concerned. Initially the specification used by 
Oum et al. (2000) was followed, one which does not allow for any individual (or 
fixed) effects due to the airlines. The regression models were estimated using 
STATA Release 8, which is adapted to provide robust standard errors from 
pooled data sets which are both cross-sectional (by airline) and time-series 
(within each airline). The regression coefficients and t-values also take into 
account the clustering effect, i.e., where there is an assumption that while the 
observations are independent across airlines, this is not necessarily the case 
within each airline panel. 
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Alliance Size, Operating Performance and Pricing Behaviour 
Using 'Y' to represent the dependent variables and ke' as the error terms, the 
researchers summarised the first part of the model as follows, where, adopting 
the specification in Oum et al. (2000), all variables are expressed in natural 
logarithms apart from GOWN and YEAR that are specified as binary. In the case 
of PARTNERS, this variable was operationalised as the actual number of partners 
plus one, to allow for the fact that in the early years o( the study period, the 
actual number of partners was zero. 
So: 
Y = a + b.PARTNERS + c.SIZE + d.AVTRIP + e.OTHER + f.GOWN + 
g.YEAR + e 
In this part of the study, 'Y' represents employee productivity (EMPROD). 
actual and passenger load factor (PLF), and the real cost to individual passengers 
per kilometre travelled (PRICE). Note that with this specification, the single 
constant term C'd) is assumed for the time being to apply to all oi' the airlines 
involved, i.e., there are no fixed airline effects. The primary concern in these 
equations is with the sign and significance of the estimated kb' coefficient. The 
prevalence of international alliances, reflecting a willingness of airlines to join 
and be joined, does suggest that the estimated value of 'b' will be positive. The 
general research question however does allow for negative effects and hence 
two-tailed tests of significance are applied here. In Table 2 the OLS regression 
results for the relationships between alliance formations and operating 
performance and pricing behaviour was presented. The t-values are in brackets 
beneath each coefficient. 
The main finding in Table 2 is that alliance size, or more strictly, changes in 
alliance size, has a significant effect on raising the level of employee productivity 
in these airlines. Alliance size however appears to have no significant effect on 
either passenger load factors or the pricing behaviour of the airlines. Specifically, 
there is no association here between larger alliances and higher airfares. In 
terms of what have been termed the control variables, larger airlines (SIZE) tend 
to be more productive and are able to offer lower real fares (PRICE). The average 
journey length (AVTRIP) however is negatively related to EMPROD, suggesting 
that the longer haul carriers are less efficient than their shorter haul counterparts. 
Airlines with high levels of government ownership (GOWN) have also tended to 
have both higher employee productivity and lower prices. 
The relationship between airline operating performance and fare levels has 
emerged from these findings and has been frequently discussed in the literature. 
In this study, it was to be expected that EMPROD to be negatively related to 
PRICE levels whereas it is also to be expected that there is a positive association 
between PLFs and PRICE. The estimated relationship is as follows: 
42 
Alliance Size and Airline Performance 
Table 2: Alliance Size, Operating Performance and Pricing Behaviour 
PLF EMPROD PRICE 
(real) 
Constant 
PARTNERS 
number 
SIZE 
ask 
AVTRIP 
kms 
OTHER 
9^non-pass 
GOWN 
dummy 
YEAR 
dummy 
R 
F statistic 
3.86 
(14.66) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.71) 
0.03 
(0.85) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.031 
(1.57) 
0.30 
5.39 
(6,75) 
9.37 
(4.61) 
0.06** 
(3.22) 
0.27** 
(2.30) 
-0.75** 
(4.36) 
-0.10** 
(1.97) 
0.40** 
(2.64) 
0.18** 
(2.87) 
0.78 
47.83 
(6,75) 
2.46 
(1.13) 
-0.01 
(0.26) 
-0.34** 
(2.59) 
0.46 
(1.60) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.72** 
(3.29) 
0.03 
(0.75) 
0.68 
20.92 
(6,75) 
Notes: i:i: is significance at the 5% or higher; * is 10% level, two-tailed tests 
PRICE ., , =4.28 - 0.51 EMPROD + 0.24 PLF 
residuals 
(t- values) (1.60) (6.86) (0.38) 
R: = 0.42 F-statistic = 23.56 (2,79) 
The dependent variable here is specified as the unstandardized residuals 
from the estimation of the PRICE (real) equation in Table 2. The results confirm 
that increases in labour productivity - attributable in part to alliance formation -
are an important determinant of cuts in the real cost of passenger air travel. 
Determinants of Airline Profitability 
The final section of the framework involves the four key drivers of profitability: 
labour productivity (EMPROD), passenger load factor (PLF), price charged in 
real terms per kilometre (PRICE), and the possible direct effect of alliance size 
(PARTNERS). 
At this stage in their study, Oum et al. (2000, p.99) were interested to identify 
whether it is productivity gains, price reductions or both that led to improved 
profitability. These authors regressed their measures of airline productivity, pricing 
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behaviour, and profitability on the same set of explanatory variables and find 
that alliance formation enhanced productivity; led to some lowering of prices; 
and had a positive effect on profitability. To discover whether the improved 
profitability was due to higher productivity, lowered prices, or both, they run 
separate univariate regressions of profitability on productivity and on price. 
These separate regressions, though not reported in their text, are the basis for 
the conclusion that productivity gains due to alliance formation are the source 
of the profitability gains. This study replicated this in the data using ROA as the 
dependent variable and produced the same result: employee productivity was 
significantly related to higher productivity and price levels were not3. The 
researchers' concern however is that resorting to separate regressions omits 
other independent variables, and so imparts bias to the estimated coefficients. 
One such variable is alliance size itself that may have a direct effect on profitability 
that is not mediated by productivity or pricing. 
The other issue that need to be addressed is the alternative specification of 
the regression model. In multiple regression with pooled data it is generally 
unsafe to assume that the same constant term can be applied to, in this case, 
each of the airlines. To counter this it is needed to allow for fixed airline-specific 
effects on profitability due to factors which are intrinsic to each airline that this 
research was unable to fully capture in other explanatory variables. This means 
introducing a new variable for each airline-estimated as a fixed effect 'constant' 
term for each airline - in place of the single common constant that have been 
hitherto assumed to apply to all airlines. In Table 3 the results of the estimating 
the profitability equations with and without these fixed effects was reported. 
In Table 3 six estimated models were reported. First, the regression results for 
the full model with both ROA and ROS as dependent variables was reported. 
There are no significant findings to report in the ROS regression but those for 
ROA do lend some support to those of Oum et al. (2000) to the extent that EMPROD 
is the most significant determinant of ROA. In this model however both higher 
prices and better load factors also have positive effects on ROA that one would 
generally expect. Alliance size is also significant but it has a negative direct effect 
on ROA. The four fixed effects models each generate different 'constant' terms for 
each airline that are not reported here. Alliance size however is significant in only 
one of these models and, in this case, its significance as a determinant of ROS is 
largely because EMPROD was excluded from the model (due to the high correlation, 
r = +0.50, between PARTNERS and EMPROD - see correlation matrix in the 
appendix). The most striking feature of the fixed effect results is that variables that 
relate to operational aspects of the airlines (alliance size, employee productivity, 
and passenger load factors) are generally rendered insignificant in the presence of 
the airline dummy variables. The variable that is consistently significant here is 
the price level charge per passenger per kilometre. This does not mean that the 
operational aspects are not important. Rather it suggests that these operational 
aspects are adequately captured by the fixed effect formulation whereas airline 
differences in pricing behaviours are not. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Airline Profitability 
Constant 
PARTNERS 
EMPROD 
PLF 
PRICE 
real 
YEAR 
dummy 
R: 
F-statistics 
ROA 
-9.95 
(2.45) 
-0.07 
(1.68)* 
0.57 
(3.08)** 
1.98 
(1.87)* 
0.22 
(2.26)** 
-0.39 
(1.16) 
0.25 
5.40 
(5,82) 
ROS 
-23.82 
(1.49) 
-0.04 
(0.35) 
0.64 
(1.06) 
5.00 
(1.17) 
0.35 
(1.10) 
-1.11 
(1.84)* 
0.27 
5.77 
(5,84) 
ROA ROA 
Fixed effect models 
ROS 
producing 
'constant' terms for each ai 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.30 
(0.63) 
-
0.59 
(2.24)** 
-0.48 
(2.19)** 
0.97 
997.42 
(11,77) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
-
1.16 
(1.15) 
0.53 
(2.02)** 
-0.46 
(2.29)** 
0.97 
849.81 
(11,83) 
0.09 
(0.74) 
0.98 
(2.06)** 
-
1.60 
(3.58) 
-1.14 
(2.40)** 
0.78 
425.9 
(11,79) 
ROS 
different 
rline. 
0.17 
(2.52)** 
-
2.23 
(0.92) 
1.42 
(3.34)** 
-1.21 
(2.35)** 
0.91 
4416.71 
(12,84) 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Before summarising the main findings, it is appropriate to comment on the 
weaknesses of this study. There is no doubt that the complexity of this industry 
would have justified the use of a larger number of airlines and hence a larger 
database. In particular, it is acknowledged that the fixed effect versions of the 
models do leave us with fewer degrees of freedom than we would have wished. 
On the other hand, given the pooled nature of the data, it was decided that some 
attempt to capture these effects was necessary. Among the key variables, it was 
accepted that publicly reported rates of return on assets and on sales may reflect 
differences in international accounting practice as well as differences in airline 
performance. This study chose however to attempt a study using measures 
which were as close as possible to the normal parlance of the industry. 
This study was motivated by Oum et al.'s (2000) pioneering study and the 
researchers have sought to replicate many aspects of their work. We conclude 
that alliance formation leads to some productivity improvements for the airlines, 
supporting that of Oum et al. (2000, p. 94). Their finding that such productivity 
gains tend to be associated with real price reductions for passengers is also 
supported. When seeking to explain airline profitability, Oum et al. (2000, p.99) 
conclude that productivity gains are more important than price behaviour, 
findings that were confirmed but somewhat qualified here on re-estimating in the 
45 
Journal of International Business and Entrepreneurship 
multivariate setting. In this research finding, the ability of airlines to charge 
more than others per passenger per kilometre is consistently associated with 
higher returns on both assets and sales. Increased alliance size does not appear 
to provide the basis for higher fares but it does appear to have a role in raising 
employee productivity and hence to have an indirect influence on airline 
profitability. There was no consistent evidence that alliance size itself had a 
direct effect on profitability: two significant effects were reported but one was 
negative (on ROA) and the other positive (on ROS). The other major effects to 
note are those assumed all along to be beyond the airlines' control and captured 
here in the year effect variables. These reflect the hostile environment in which 
the airlines have to operate with estimated coefficients that are normally 
significant and negative. Returning to the extracts that was used at the beginning 
to frame this research, it is concluded that adding new members to an alliance 
may indeed have the direct effect of reducing the return on assets of the member 
airlines. If increases in alliance size are to create additional value for airline 
stakeholders, the focus has to be on using the alliance to raise employee 
productivity, and hence improved returns. 
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Notes 
1
 The Purchasing Power Parity historical series was supplied by the OECD at 
www.oecd.org/std/ppp. The USA GDP deflators were supplied on request 
from the archive of the World Bank at info@worldbank.org. 
2
 Average values of government ownership provided in Oum et al. (2000, p.86) 
for the period 1986-1995 was used. GOWN = 1 when the majority control 
applies, 0 otherwise. Air New Zealand was the only carrier not included in 
this study. It has been in majority government control for most of the period. 
3
 The results of these regressions have not been reported here. 
References 
Brueckner, J. and Whalen, T. (2000). The Price Effects of International Airline 
Alliances. Journal of Law and Economies, 43, 503-545. 
46 
Mean 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
PLF(%) 
EMPROD 
PRICE real 
ROA (%) 
ROS(%) 
PARTNERS 
SIZE (askm) 
AVTRIP (km) 
OTHER (%) 
GOWN (0,1) 
69.97 
619.52 
9.83 
7.28 
5.54 
7.2 
89676 
3157 
23.27 
0.36 
Correlation matrix of main variables 
1 2 3 4 5 
.26** .08 .25** .34** 
-.65** .28** .15 
-.09 -.04 
.69** 
6 7 8 9 10 
.36** 
.50** 
-.24* 
.05 
.20* 
-.02 
.58** 
_ 29** 
.17 
-.03 
.45** 
.35** 
- .31** 
.02 
-.02 
.09 
-.04 
-.07 
.08 
-.46** 
.24* 
-.14 
-.03 
-.14 
-.35** 
.46** 
.18* 
-.10 
-.45** 
.02 
.19* 
-.11 
-.54** 
.45** 
.17 
Note: ** significant at 0.01 level. * significant at 0.05 level. The correlation coefficients have been computed on the transformed values of the variables 
as used in the regression analyses. 
Journal of International Business and Entrepreneurs/lip 
Button, K., Haynes, K., and Stough, R. (1998). Flying into the Future: Air 
Transport Policy in the European Union. Cheltenham, England: Edward 
Elgar. 
Dresner, M., Flicop S. and Windle R. (1995). Trans-Atlantic Airline Alliances: a 
preliminary evaluation. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, 35. 
13-25. 
Gellman Research Associates (1994). A Study of International Airline Code 
Sharing. Washington DC: Office of Aviation and International Economics, 
US Department of Transportation. 
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1996). The Alliance Revolution - the new shape of business 
rivalry. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Jarillo, J .C. (1993). Strategic Networks. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Morrison, S. A. (2001). Actual, Adjacent, and Potential Competition - estimating 
the full effect of Southwest Airlines. Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, 35,239-256. 
Oum, T. H, Park, J.H and Zhang, A. (2000). Globalisation and Strategic Alliances: 
the case of the airline industry. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Park, J. H. (1997). The Effects of Airline Alliances on Markets and Economic 
Welfare. Transportation Research £ . ,33, 181 -194. 
UK Civil Aviation Authority (1994). Airline Competition on European Long 
Haul Routes. London: CAP 639, Civil Aviation Authority. 
US General Accounting Office (1995). International Aviation: airline alliances 
produce benefits, but effect on competition is uncertain. GAO/RCED-95-
99. Washington DC. 
Youssef, W. and Hansen M. (1994). Consequences of Strategic Alliances between 
International Airlines: the case of Swissair and SAS. Transportation 
Research,2SA, 415-431. 
ROBERT T HAMILTON, Department of Management, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Chr is tchurch 1, New Zealand. 
E-mail: bob.hamilton@canterbury.ac.nz Tel: + 64 3 364 2467 (direct) Fax: + 64 3 
3642020 
SUSSIEC MORRISH, Dept of Marketing, University of Auckland, Private Bag 
92019, Private Bag, Auckland, New Zealand. E-mail: s.morrish@auckland.ac.nz 
Tel: + 64 9 373 7599 Fax: + 64 9 373 7444 
48 
